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ABSTRACT
Advances in Machine Learning (ML) have led to its adoption as
an integral component in many applications, including banking,
medical diagnosis, and driverless cars. To further broaden the use
of ML models, cloud-based services offered by Microsoft, Ama-
zon, Google, and others have developed ML-as-a-service tools as
black-box systems. However, ML classifiers are vulnerable to ad-
versarial examples: inputs that are maliciously modified can cause
the classifier to provide adversary-desired outputs. Moreover, it
is known that adversarial examples generated on one classifier are
likely to cause another classifier to make the same mistake, even
if the classifiers have different architectures or are trained on dis-
joint datasets. This property, which is known as transferability,
opens up the possibility of attacking black-box systems by generat-
ing adversarial examples on a substitute classifier and transferring
the examples to the target classifier.
Therefore, the key to protect black-box learning systems against
the adversarial examples is to block their transferability. To this
end, we propose a training method that, as the input is more per-
turbed, the classifier smoothly outputs lower confidence on the orig-
inal label and instead predicts that the input is “invalid”. In essence,
we augment the output class set with a NULL label and train the
classifier to reject the adversarial examples by classifying them as
NULL. In experiments, we apply a wide range of attacks based
on adversarial examples on the black-box systems. We show that
a classifier trained with the proposed method effectively resists
against the adversarial examples, while maintaining the accuracy
on clean data.
1. INTRODUCTION
Machine learning (ML) techniques have substantially advanced
in the past decade and are having significant impacts on every-
day lives. Success of ML algorithms has led to an explosion in
demand. ML models are also increasingly applied in security-
sensitive and critical systems; for instance, autonomous vehicles
heavily rely on computer vision algorithms [1] and the system se-
curity is of paramount importance. To further broaden and simplify
the use of ML algorithms, cloud-based services offered by Ama-
zon, Google, Microsoft, BigML, and others have developed ML-as-
a-service tools. Thus, users and companies can readily benefit from
ML applications without having to train or host their own models.
The wide deployment of the remotely-hosted systems signifies the
importance of studying the security of the black-box learning sys-
tems, where the adversary does not have access to the model pa-
rameters.
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Figure 1: Illustration of the original and NULL labeling methods on
an image from MNIST dataset, and three adversarial examples with
different perturbations. The classifier assigns a probability vector
to each image. With more perturbation, the NULL labeling method
assigns higher probability to the NULL label, while the original
labeling increases the probabilities of other labels.
The implicit assumption in training ML models is that they will
be deployed in benign settings. However, many works have pointed
out their vulnerability in adversarial scenarios [2–7]. One type of
the vulnerabilities of the ML classifiers is that an adversary can
significantly change the algorithm output by slightly perturbing the
input. Such modified inputs are called adversarial examples [8].
The adversary’s goal is to cause the model to either misclassify
the input (misclassification attack) or output a target label (targeted
attack). Attacks based on adversarial examples can be categorized
according to the adversary’s knowledge about the system. If the ad-
versary has full knowledge about the internal structure of the clas-
sifier, she can solve an optimization problem to obtain the smallest
change that has the largest adversary-desired influence on the out-
put [9–11].
However, in many real-world applications, the adversary may
not have access to the system parameters. Therefore, a more real-
istic attack model is the black-box model, where we assume that
the adversary only possesses a small dataset and has an oracle ac-
cess to the system, i.e., she can query the classifier with any input
and obtain its output label [12]. Because of the adversary’s limited
knowledge, it may seem that black-box systems are secure against
adversarial examples. However, it has been shown that adversarial
examples, generated on one classifier, are likely to cause another
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classifier to make the same mistake, even if the the classifiers have
different architectures or are trained on disjoint datasets. This prop-
erty is known as transferability [8]. In [12,13], Papernot et al. used
the transferability property to attack remotely-hosted learning sys-
tems (e.g. Amazon AWS) using the adversarial examples generated
on a substitute classifier.
Therefore, the key to protect black-box learning systems against
the adversarial examples is to block their transferability. The ques-
tion is: can we train the classifier to discard adversarial exam-
ples, while maintaining the accuracy on the clean data? We study
this problem in the black-box setting and observed that adversarial
examples transferred from the substitute classifier can be viewed
as the noisy version of the adversarial examples generated on the
target classifier. In common ML classifiers, the predictions vary
smoothly around the input samples, i.e., they classify the noisy
samples into the same label as the clean samples. This property en-
ables the transferability of the adversarial examples. To block trans-
ferability, we propose a training method such that, as the input is
more perturbed, the classifier shows lower confidence on the orig-
inal label and instead declares that the input is “invalid”. During
the training phase, the classifier examines the distinction between
the clean and adversarial data, and learns to discard the adversarial
examples, while keeping the clean inputs.
In this paper, we make the following contributions:
• It is reasonable to assume that the adversary may not have
any access to the target system. Therefore, considering the
black-box model, we propose a more restricted adversary’s
model called Blind Model. In the blind model, the adver-
sary only possesses a small dataset and, unlike the black-box
model, cannot query the target classifier. Using the transfer-
ability property of adversarial examples, we develop attacks
on learning systems under both black-box and blind models.
• We experimentally evaluate the robustness of the black-box
learning systems against the adversarial examples. In partic-
ular, we consider 1) online learning systems from Amazon
and Microsoft oracles, 2) deep neural networks, and 3) neural
networks trained to be robust [9]. We show that even under
the blind model, the adversary can mount both the misclassi-
fication and targeted attacks. This further represents a more
serious attack vector on black-box learning systems.
• We then propose a defense framework for black-box systems
to block the transferability of the adversarial examples. Es-
sentially, we augment the output class set of the classifier
with an additional label called NULL. During the training
phase, we generate adversarial examples and train the ML
algorithm to label them as NULL with appropriate proba-
bilities according to the amount of perturbation. We show
that the proposed method can effectively reject adversarial
examples, by classifying them as NULL, while classifying
the clean data as their original labels.
As an illustration, Fig. 1 compares the approach of NULL label-
ing with the original labeling. The ML classifier assigns a prob-
ability vector to each image. As the input is more perturbed, the
classifier’s belief in the ground-truth label decreases and eventu-
ally, with enough perturbation, the adversary can cause the classi-
fier to misclassify the input with high confidence. However, with
NULL labeling, as the input is more perturbed, the classifier as-
signs higher probability to the NULL label, and thus discards the
adversarial example.
2. PRELIMINARIES
Traditional ML models can be partitioned into two categories of
supervised or unsupervised learning, which are the tasks of infer-
ring a function from labeled training data or inferring a function
to describe hidden structure from unlabeled data, respectively [14].
Similar to previous works on adversarial learning [8–13], we re-
strict ourselves to the problem of learning multi-class classifiers in
supervised settings.
A classifier is a function that maps the input feature vector X
to the output probability vector Z, where Zi, the i-th element of
the vector Z, represents the probability that the input belongs to
the i-th class. For each input, the output label is the class with the
highest probability. The training data is composed of the labeled
samples (X, y). We assume that input features are continuous and
bounded and, without loss of generality, assume they are bounded
between 0 and 1, i.e., Xi ∈ [0, 1].
Throughout this paper, we demonstrate the results on two ML
datasets, MNIST [15] and German Traffic Signs Recognition Bench-
mark (GTSRB) [16]. MNIST is a dataset of handwritten digits with
70, 000 gray-scale images of size 28×28, split into three groups of
50, 000 training samples, 10, 000 validation samples, and 10, 000
test samples. The task involves the classification of images of digits
into one of 10 classes, corresponding to digits 0 to 9. GTSRB is
a dataset of color images of 43 traffic signs, with 39, 209 training
samples, and 12, 630 test samples. Images vary in size; we resize
all images to the same size as MNIST inputs (28 × 28 gray-scale
images) and pass them through a histogram equalization filter. We
also randomize the ordering of the training data and use the first
5, 000 samples as the validation set. Some representative samples
of each dataset are shown in Figure 2. We present the experimental
results on Deep Neural Networks (DNN). The network structures
used for MNIST and GTSRB datasets are given in Appendix A.
Figure 2: Representative samples from MNIST dataset (top) and
GTSRB dataset (bottom).
3. ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we provide the definition of adversarial examples
and review different methods for generating adversarial examples
and defending against them. We describe the techniques which are
most relevant to our context and will explore other techniques in
more details in Section 6.
3.1 Definition of Adversarial Examples
ML classifiers are vulnerable to adversarial perturbations, i.e., an
adversary can slightly perturb an input such that the classifier will
output the wrong label, yet a human will classify it correctly [8].
Such modified inputs are called adversarial examples. As ML sys-
tems are being increasingly integrated into critical and security-
sensitive applications, the existence of such adversarial examples
poses a major security threat to these systems. The feasibility of
generating adversarial examples have been demonstrated in real-
world applications [12, 13, 17]. Also, in [18], it has been shown
that generating such inputs is practical in physical world scenarios,
where the samples, for instance, are perceived through a camera.
2
Figure 3: Adversarial examples on a DNN. Examples are gener-
ated on one sample of the MNIST dataset (top) and GTSRB dataset
(bottom). From left to right: original image, adversarial examples
generated using Grad0 and FGS methods.
3.2 Generating Adversarial Examples
Attacks based on adversarial examples have one of the follow-
ing goals [11]: 1) Misclassification Attack: The adversary causes
the classifier to output a label different from the original label, and
2) Targeted Attack: The adversary causes the classifier to output a
specific label. For generating an adversarial example, the adversary
perturbs the input so as to decrease the confidence of the classifier
on the original label (for misclassification attack) or increase the
confidence on the target label (for targeted attack). The pertur-
bation however should be small, in order to remain unnoticeable
by human observer. Formally, the adversary’s problem is: given
(X, y), find X∗ = X + δX such that the classifier maps X∗ into
the adversary-desired label and ‖δX‖≤  · δmax, where δmax de-
notes the maximum possible perturbation. When ‖δX‖=  · δmax,
we say X∗ is an -perturbation of X .
In [9], Goodfellow et al. proposed a gradient-based method
for the misclassification attack called Fast Gradient Sign (FGS)
method. Given the classifier, FGS method generates adversarial
examples with respect to the L∞ norm constraint. In this paper,
we adopt the technique for the L0 norm constraint, i.e., we gener-
ate adversarial examples with changing few input features, called
adversarial features. We call our method as Grad0. We also pro-
pose a Greedy Method for the targeted attack, which follows the
gradient-based approach, but selects one adversarial feature at a
time. In Appendix B, we will explain different methods for gen-
erating adversarial examples in detail. Figure 3 represents some
adversarial examples on a DNN. The examples are generated using
the gradient-based method with different norm constraints on one
sample of the MNIST and GTSRB datasets.
3.3 Robust Training Method
One natural countermeasure against the adversarial examples is
to change the training procedure to reflect the fact that perturbations
of each training sample should be classified as the original class.
This method is alternatively called as adversarial training [9] or
robust training [19]. Mathematically, this is equivalent to training
with the objective function:
θ∗ = argmin
θ
α`(X, y; θ) + (1− α)`(X∗, y; θ),
where `(X, y; θ) denotes the loss of the classifier with parame-
ters θ on (X, y), X∗ is an adversarial example generated using
a gradient-based method and the parameter α ∈ [0, 1] balances the
training on the clean and adversarial samples. This approach itera-
tively creates a supply of adversarial examples and trains the classi-
fier to correctly classify them. It has been shown that the modified
objective function makes the classifier more resistant to adversarial
examples. For consistency, we call the robust training as Robust0
or Robust∞ methods, according to the type of the norm constraint
that is used for generating the adversarial examples.
Initial Training
Adversarial 
TrainingArchitecture
Training Data
Classifier 
Parameters
Training Data
Oracle
Adversarial Examples Labels
Classifier 
Parameters
Figure 4: Block diagram of the proposed method for training the
substitute classifier in the black-box model. In the adversarial train-
ing phase, we alternatively train the classifier on the clean data
and generated adversarial examples, for which we get the labels
by querying the oracle.
4. THE PROPOSED ATTACKS
In this section, we present the attack methods and provide the
experimental results on attacking various ML classifiers.
4.1 Threat Models
We present the results under two threat models which differ based
on the adversary’s capability of querying the target system. The
models are described in the following.
• Black-Box Model: The adversary possesses a limited set of
labeled data, with the same distribution as the target’s train-
ing data, and also has an oracle access to the system, i.e., she
can query the classifier for any input and get the correspond-
ing label.
• Blind Model: The adversary possesses a limited set of la-
beled data, with the same distribution as the target’s training
data. However, unlike the black-box model, the adversary is
blind to the target system, i.e., she does not have any kind of
access to the classifier.
In black-box model, the distinction between knowledge of labels
and the output probability vectors is important, since, in real world
applications, users often have access to output labels than output
probability vectors; the adversary is however weaker because labels
contain much less information about the classifier’s behavior [12].
4.2 Training Substitute Classifier
In the following, we present the training method of the substitute
classifier under the black-box and blind models.
Black-Box Model. We intend to train the substitute classifier in a
way that it can mimic the decision boundaries of the target classi-
fier. For this, we iteratively update the classifier and query the or-
acle for labels of the new adversarial examples generated based on
the current classifier parameters. However, since the adversary pos-
sesses only a small set of labeled data, during the first few epochs,
the classifier accuracy is very low. As a result, the generated adver-
sarial examples do not lie on the decision boundaries of the target
classifier. Therefore, to generate higher quality adversarial exam-
ples, we need to first train the substitute classifier on the clean data
for a certain number of epochs, which we refer to as initial training.
After the initial training, if we only train the classifier on the gen-
erated adversarial examples, the classifier starts to perform poorly
on the clean data. Therefore, we propose to alternatively train the
substitute classifier on the clean and adversarial examples to keep
the classifier fairly accurate on the clean data and also enable it
to learn the decision boundaries of the target classifier. Figure 4
depicts the block diagram of the proposed method for training the
substitute classifier in the black-box model.
3
Table 1: Test accuracies of different classifiers trained on MNIST
and GTSRB datasets.
ML Classifiers MNIST GTSRB
DNN 99.35% 97.77%
DNN trained with Robust0 method 98.81% 97.05%
DNN trained with Robust∞ method 99.39% 96.80%
Amazon Oracle 92.00% 72.81%
Microsoft Oracle 97.73% 85.76%
Blind Model. The procedure is similar to the black-box model,
except that, since the adversary cannot query the target classifier,
she only does the initial training for the substitute classifier.
In both the black-box and blind models, the adversary gener-
ates adversarial examples on the substitute classifier and transfers
them to the target classifier. For generating adversarial examples, a
gradient-based method is used for misclassification, and the greedy
method is used for targeted attack. If the adversary can success-
fully attack the substitute classifier, the generated samples are used
as the adversarial examples for the target classifier.
4.3 Experimental Results
We present the results for the blind model and for adversarial
examples generated by Grad0 method. The attacks under the black-
box model are strictly more successful than those in the blind model.
Also, the adversarial examples generated by the FGS method per-
form similar to the Grad0 method. We train the substitute classifier
for 50 epochs, and then generate adversarial examples on avail-
able data with a perturbation ranging from 2.5% to 20% of the
maximum possible perturbation. In experiments with the MNIST
dataset, we assume that the adversary possesses 100 labeled sam-
ples for training the substitute classifier and an additional 50 la-
beled samples for validation. For GTSRB, we assume that the ad-
versary possesses 250 labeled samples, of which 150 samples are
used for training and 100 labeled samples for validation. For train-
ing the substitute classifier, we use the data from MNIST and GT-
SRB validation set. The number of samples is chosen such that we
will have sufficient data from all classes. Using more data samples
increases the adversary’s success rate.
We apply the attacks on a DNN and also on robust DNNs trained
with different types of adversarial examples. For training the ro-
bust classifiers, we set α = 0.5 and use 0.1- and 0.3-perturbed ad-
versarial examples, respectively for MNIST and GTSRB datasets.
The classifiers are trained on the DNN structures described in Ap-
pendix A. We perform the attacks also on two ML-as-a-service plat-
forms: 1) Amazon Web Services Oracle: We train a classifier using
the Amazon ML platform which is part of the Amazon Web Ser-
vices (AWS)1, and 2) Microsoft Azure Oracle: We set up a neural
network classifier on the Microsoft Azure ML platform2.
Table 1 provides the test accuracies of the different classifiers
trained on MNIST and GTSRB datasets. It can be seen that Robust∞
method slightly improves the test accuracy on MNIST, but decreases
the accuracy on GTSRB. The Robust0 method however decreases
the accuracy on both datasets. The classifiers trained on Amazon
platform have relatively very low accuracy, while the classifiers
trained on Microsoft platform yield moderate accuracy on MNIST
and low accuracy on GTSRB dataset.
In the following, we show that we can generate adversarial exam-
ples on the substitute classifier and also transfer them to the target
1https://aws.amazon.com/machine-learning/
2https://studio.azureml.net/
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Figure 5: Adversary’s success rate in generating adversarial exam-
ples on substitute classifier for different amount of perturbations.
Note that since the adversary has full knowledge about the substi-
tute classifier, we expect to have high adversary’s success rate.
classifier. Figure 5 shows the adversary’s success rate in gener-
ating the adversarial examples on the substitute classifier. It can
be seen that by allowing higher perturbation (), the adversary’s
success rate quickly increases. Recall that the adversarial example
X∗ = X + δX is an -perturbation of X , if ‖δX‖=  · δmax,
where δmax is the maximum possible perturbation.
Figure 6 shows the transferability rate of the adversarial exam-
ples to different classifiers for misclassification and targeted at-
tacks. The transferability rates are higher in general for MNIST
and, as expected, misclassification attack is more successful than
the targeted attack. For GTSRB dataset, the transferability rate is
relatively low for Amazon-based classifier, especially for the tar-
geted attack. The reason might be that since the Amazon classifier
performs poorly on clean data, it is also difficult to force it to output
a specific target label for an adversarial example.
The results show that robust training provides some resistance
against the adversarial examples under the blind model. The trans-
ferability rates however increase in the black-box model, where the
adversary is allowed to query the target classifier. Recall that in
blind model, the adversary only possesses a few labeled samples,
yet we show that we can achieve high transferability rates. Our re-
sults are significantly better than the current state of the art for the
targeted attack. For example, in [12], for the MNIST dataset and
at  = 28.57%, the average transferability is 55.53%, while we
achieved 66% and 78% transferability rates on the DNN classifier
for  = 10% and 20%, respectively, without querying the target
classifier.
5. THE PROPOSED DEFENSE METHOD
In this section, we propose the NULL labeling method for de-
fending against adversarial examples under black-box settings and
evaluate its robustness through the simulations.
5.1 Our Goal and Methodology
The attacks based on adversarial examples on black-box learning
systems rely on the transferability property. Therefore, the key to
protect ML oracles is to block the transferability of adversarial ex-
amples. Since the decision boundaries of two classifiers trained on
equally distributed datasets are approximately the same, an adver-
sarial example for one classifier can be viewed as the noisy version
of the adversarial examples for another classifier. In common ML
classifiers, the predictions vary smoothly around the input samples,
i.e., they classify the noisy samples into the same label as the clean
samples. This enables the transferability of the adversarial exam-
ples. To block transferability, we propose to train the classifier such
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(a) Misclassification attack on classifiers trained on MNIST dataset.
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(b) Targeted attack on classifiers trained on MNIST dataset.
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(c) Misclassification attack on classifiers trained on GTSRB dataset.
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(d) Targeted attack on classifiers trained on GTSRB dataset.
Figure 6: Transferability rate of adversarial examples to different ML classifiers under the blind model.
that, as the input noise level increases, the classifier shows lower
confidence on the original label and instead declares the input as
invalid. The method should however maintain the accuracy on the
clean inputs.
To this end, similar to previous methods [9, 19, 20], we train the
classifier also on adversarial examples generated from the clean
data. However, since our goal is to identify and discard the ma-
licious data rather than predicting their original label, we train the
classifier to label the adversarial examples as “not-a-valid-input".
But, the distribution of the test data is also likely to slightly deviate
from that of the training data. Therefore, if we train the classifier to
discard all perturbed inputs, regardless of the amount of perturba-
tion, the classifier will perform poorly on clean test data. Hence, we
need a measure to decide how likely an input sample is adversarial.
To this end, as illustrated in Figure 1, we augment the output class
set with a NULL label and train the classifier such that the NULL
probability assigned to each input represents the belief of classifier
that it is adversarial.
5.2 Techniques Used in Proposed Method
We use the following techniques in the proposed training method.
Label Smoothing. We use the label-smoothing regularization tech-
nique proposed in [21]. In this technique, we train the classifier on
modified output probability vectors, for which the probability of
the ground-truth label is decreased and the rest of the probability
is distribute uniformly to other labels. Assume that we have K
classes. If we decrease the probability of the ground-truth label to
q, each one of other labels will get 1−q
K−1 probability. This technique
encourages the classifier to be less confident on clean data and is
shown to help the generalization.
MG Method: Misclassification Attack Using Greedy Method. We
use MG method to generate adversarial examples for the misclas-
sification attack. We adopt the gradient-based method, but take a
greedy approach, i.e., we select and modify one feature at a time
until the input is successfully misclassified.
STG Method: Smooth Targeted Attack Based on Gradient Method.
We train the classifier on the adversarial examples generated for
the targeted attack. However, unlike current methods, we set a soft
target, i.e., the target output probability vector is 1
K
for the K valid
classes. We use the L0 norm constraint for generating adversarial
examples. The details of MG and STG methods are provided in
Appendix B.
5.3 The NULL Labeling Method
The proposed method is composed of three steps: 1) initial train-
ing, 2) computingNULL probabilities for adversarial examples gen-
erated with different amount of perturbations, and 3) adversarial
training. Figure 7 depicts the block diagram of the proposed train-
ing method. In the following, we describe our method in details.
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Figure 7: Block diagram of NULL labeling method. In adversarial
training phase, the classifier is trained on both clean and adversarial
data. The classifier learns to map adversarial examples to theNULL
label with a probability according to their amount of perturbation.
Initial Training. Since the classifier parameters are initialized ran-
domly, the adversarial examples generated at the beginning do not
resemble those of the final classifier. Therefore, we initially train
the classifier only on the clean data to generate higher quality ad-
versarial examples.
Computing NULL Probabilities for Adversarial Examples. We
then need to compute a function f that assigns a proper NULL
probability pNULL to the adversarial examples, generated during the
training phase, according to their amount of perturbation. For com-
puting the function f , we apply the MG method on validation data.
Note that MG method takes a greedy approach for generating ad-
versarial examples for the misclassification attack. Therefore, we
succeed by perturbing relatively few number of input features.
If a fraction α of the generated adversarial examples have per-
turbation less than , we set the NULL probability for -perturbed
inputs to be α. This shows with what probability we can cause the
classifier to misclassify an input, if we are allowed to perturb  · |X|
number of features. We compute the function f on the classifier
obtained after the initial phase and use it for the entire adversarial
training phase. Figure 8 depicts the function f for DNNs trained
on MNIST and GTSRB datasets.
Adversarial Training. During the adversarial training phase, in
each epoch and for each sample, we train on the clean sample or its
corresponding adversarial example, with probabilities α and 1−α,
respectively. Adversarial examples are generated using the STG
method, with a number of adversarial features, which is chosen
uniformly at random between one and Nmax, where Nmax is the
minimum number for which f(Nmax|X| ) = 1. The STG method mod-
ifies inputs such that the output probability increases for all valid
labels other than the ground-truth label. The classifier is however
trained to map the adversarial examples to a vector which shows
high probability at the NULL label. Essentially, the classifier adap-
tively finds the problematic directions around each input sample
and corrects itself by nullifying them.
Formally, we train the network by repeatedly solving the follow-
ing optimization problems:{
δX∗ = argminδX `(X + δX,ZT ; θ), s.t. ‖δX‖0∼ U [1, Nmax]
θ∗ = argminθ α`(X,Z; θ) + (1− α)`(X + δX∗, ZA; θ)
where U denotes the uniform distribution and α represents how of-
ten we train on original training data and controls the trade-off be-
tween test accuracy and the ability to detect adversarial examples.
The vector ZT is the smooth target probability vector that we use to
generate adversarial examples, which is zero at the NULL label and
1
K
otherwise. The vector ZA is however the desired output proba-
bility vector and is obtained as illustrated in Figure 9. We first com-
pute the NULL probability as pNULL = f( ‖δX
∗‖0
|X| ) and modify the
probability of the ground-truth label from q to q′ = q(1 − pNULL).
The probability of the rest of the labels will then be (1−q)(1−pNULL)
(K−1) .
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Figure 8: Probability of the NULL label for an adversarial example
versus , the ratio of the number of adversarial features, for DNNs
trained on MNIST and GTSRB datasets.
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Labels
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Figure 9: Illustration of the NULL labeling with label smoothing
technique. Assume that there are K valid classes and the i-th label
is the ground-truth. Label smoothing technique assigns a probabil-
ity q to the ground-truth label and distributes the rest of the prob-
ability uniformly to other valid labels, i.e., p = 1−q
K−1 . Similarly,
for an adversarial example with NULL probability pNULL, we set
q′ = q(1 − pNULL) and p′ = (1−q)(1−pNULL)(K−1) . Note that in Fig-
ure 1, for simplicity, we did not incorporate the label smoothing
technique in illustration of the NULL labeling method.
5.4 Experimental Results
Note that in attacks based on adversarial examples, the adversary
seeks to avoid being detected. Therefore, an adversarial example
which is misclassified to the NULL label is considered as a failed
attack, because a NULL labeled input signals a suspicious activity.
Specifically, a misclassification attack is successful if the classifier
maps the input to a label, other than the original or theNULL labels.
Similarly, in targeted attack, the NULL label cannot be considered
as a possible target label.
We train the classifier for only 1 epoch in initial training and 200
epochs in adversarial training phase. Fixing α = 0.5, the only hy-
perparameter introduced by our method is the label smoothing pa-
rameter q, which is inherited from the label smoothing technique.
We set q as the value that maximizes the validation accuracy, and
obtained q = 0.9 for MNIST dataset and q = 0.6 for GTSRB
dataset. We output the classifier parameters that resulted in the
highest validation accuracy. The test accuracies for MNIST and
GTSRB datasets are 99.46% and 97.37%, respectively. Compared
to a DNN with the same structure, our proposed method slightly
increases the test accuracy for MNIST, and slightly decreases the
test accuracy for GTSRB. Also, for both datasets, our method out-
performs the adversarial training methods.
The attack settings are the same as those in Section 4.3. In the
black-box model, we train the substitute classifier for 50 epochs
in initial training and 100 epochs in adversarial training. During
the adversarial training phase, the adversary queries the oracle with
generated adversarial examples and, for some of them, receives the
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Figure 10: Transferability rate of adversarial examples to the classifier trained with the NULL labeling method on GTSRB dataset.
NULL label. We take two approaches for training the substitute
classifier. The first approach is to discard those samples, and the
second approach is to augment the output class set and train the
classifier to map those examples into the NULL label. In experi-
ments, we found that the second approach performs slightly better
and thus we report the results based on this approach. Neverthe-
less, our results show that querying the proposed classifier with
adversarial examples does not help much to train a better substi-
tute classifier, since the target classifier returns NULL for most of
the queries and thus the substitute classifier gains little information
about the target’s decision boundaries.
We examine the transferability rates of the adversarial exam-
ples generated using Grad0 and FGS methods (for misclassifica-
tion attack) and the greedy method (for targeted attack), under both
black-box and blind models. For the MNIST dataset, in all cases
the transferability rate is zero. This means that MNIST data have
enough redundancy so that the classifier can perfectly distinguish
between the clean data and adversarial examples transferred from
other classifiers. However, for the GTSRB dataset, the classifier
cannot discard all the adversarial examples while keeping the clean
samples. Figure 10 shows the transferability rate of the adversarial
examples. The classifier typically maps the adversarial examples
with small perturbations to their original label, and the adversar-
ial examples with high perturbations to the NULL label. However,
moderate perturbations can cause the classifier to mistakenly label
the input. Nevertheless, the transferability rate is near zero for ad-
versarial examples generated with L0 norm constraint and less than
10% with L∞ norm constraint.
5.5 Discussion
Here, we discuss the advantages of enhancing ML classifiers
with an additional label to detect out-of-distribution inputs.
The Essence of NULL Labeling. During the training process, the
classifier gradually learns to properly place the data into the multi-
dimensional space of the input features and form the class bound-
aries by packing the data of different classes into clusters. However,
for most of naturally distributed data, most of the space is empty;
this is verified by the observations that projecting the space down
to even a relatively small number of principal components usually
yields reasonable accuracy [22]. Therefore, the classifier is never
trained for the most of the input space, because of the implicit as-
sumption that it will be always tested on the data that follow the
same distribution as the training data. This however exposes the
classifier to maliciously perturbed or out-of-distribution inputs.
As a result, we need a mechanism for classifiers to reject the
invalid inputs [6]. We hypothesize that ML classifiers, aside from
learning the boundaries of different classes, can be trained to also
learn the distribution of the valid input data. Hence, a classifier
can first inspect the distribution of an input, and if it is not close
to that of the training data, it will be rejected. In this way, we
can practically block the unused space of the input features and
robustify the classifier to adversarial examples. To implement this
idea, we propose adding an extra label, calledNULL label, and train
the classifier to recognize and reject the out-of-distribution inputs
by classifying them as NULL.
Human-in-the-loop AI. When receiving an adversarial example, one
approach is to determine the original label of the input. In this pa-
per, we suggest that an alternative approach would be to reject the
input and potentially obtain another measurement or ask a human
expert to inspect the data. This approach proves to be safer and
more reasonable in many applications, as discarding an input may
incur only a small cost, whereas, misclassifying or even accepting
an adversarial sample can lead to a harmful situation. For example,
in applications such as medical diagnosis and bioinformatics, the
cost of rejecting a sample can be additional medical tests, which
is far more acceptable than taking the risk of deciding based on a
potentially perturbed sample. As another example, consider self-
driving cars, for which ML classifiers are used to recognize signs
or other vehicles on the road [1]. Perturbing the input of such sys-
tems may force the classifier to misclassify it and may eventually
cause an accident. In contrast, if the classifier detects that the input
is untrusted, it can quickly notify the human deriver to take over
until the threat is resolved.
Rejecting the dubious data in the test phase has been imple-
mented in the “human-in-the-loop” computing. The idea is that
if the classifier’s confidence in the output label is below a cer-
tain value, it sends the data to a human annotator to make a judg-
ment [23]. Adversarial examples are however subtly modified data
which can cause the classifier to report high confidence in a wrong
class. Therefore, the current rejection systems are not resistant
against such adversaries. Instead, we proposed the NULL labeling
method to systematically train the classifier to detect anomalies,
rather than just discarding the data based on the confidence value.
Therefore, our proposed training method can further empower the
current systems to defend against broader range of adversaries.
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6. RELATED WORK
The security of learning systems has been studied from different
perspectives [2–7]. One vulnerability of ML classifiers is the ex-
istence of adversarial examples [8]. In this section, we review the
works on the related attack and defense methods.
6.1 Attacks Methods
Several works have proposed methods for generating adversar-
ial examples on ML classifiers [9–11, 24]. In [25, 26], adversarial
examples have been also applied to other ML models, such as vari-
ational autoencoder [27] and generative adversarial networks [28].
A related concept to adversarial examples is fooling images, which
are images that are completely unrecognizable to humans, but ML
classifiers confidently map them to recognizable objects [29].
Preceding papers demonstrated the vulnerability of learning sys-
tems against adversaries with full knowledge about the classifier.
Another line of works assumes that the adversary does not have ac-
cess to the classifier parameters. The attacks on black-box learning
systems rely on the transferability property of the adversarial ex-
amples [8]. This property has been exploited in [12, 13] to mount
attacks on ML oracles by transferring adversarial examples from a
substitute classifier. In [30], the authors proposed ensemble-based
approaches to generate transferable adversarial examples. In [31],
the authors showed the existence of a universal (image-agnostic)
adversarial perturbation that transfers across images as well as dif-
ferent classifiers.
In this paper, we considered a black-box model where the ad-
versary possesses a small dataset and has an oracle access to the
target, i.e., she can obtain the label for any input by querying the
target classifier. We also proposed the blind model where the adver-
sary only possesses a small dataset and has no access to the target
classifier. We showed that we can achieve high transferability rates
for both misclassification and targeted attacks, even when a defense
method has been employed. Similar to many of the previous works,
e.g., [8–13, 18, 32], we demonstrated the results on image classi-
fiers, though adversarial examples can be generated also for other
data types [17, 33–35].
6.2 Defense Methods
Existing defense techniques can be grouped into four categories
of preprocessing methods, methods based on regularization and ad-
versarial training, the distillation method and classification with re-
jection. In the following, we review the defense methods.
Preprocessing Methods. Natural images have special properties,
such as high correlation among adjacent pixels, sparsity in trans-
form domain or having low energy in high frequencies [36]. Hy-
pothesizing that adversarial changes do not lie in the same space as
natural images, several works considered reversing the adversary’s
effect by passing the images through a filter [37–41]. Although pre-
processing the inputs makes the attack more challenging, it does not
remove its possibility. Moreover, these filters usually decrease the
classifier accuracy on clean data.
Regularization and Adversarial Training. Several works pro-
posed improving the robustness of ML classifiers by regulariza-
tion [42–44], adversarial training [9,19,20,45–48], or label smooth-
ing [49]. In these methods, the accuracy on adversarial examples
is however substantially lower than the accuracy on clean data.
For instance, in one experiment in [9], it is reported that without
adversarial training, the classifier had an error rate of 89.4% on
adversarial examples and, with adversarial training, the error rate
fell to 17.9%; however, the error rate of clean data is reported as
smaller than 1%. This means that we cannot fully rely on these
defense mechanisms when deploying learning systems in critical
applications. Moreover, in experiments we showed that we can
successfully mount attacks on robust learning systems under the
blind model. Therefore, these methods are not effective against
adversarial examples.
Distillation Method. In [32], Papernot et al. proposed a mech-
anism called defensive distillation to reduce the effectiveness of
adversarial samples, by preventing the attacker from progressively
selecting adversarial features. In [10], the authors showed that an
adversary, with access to the classifier parameters, can revert the
effect of the distillation. We have studied the distillation method
also in the black-box and blind models and verified that it does
not improve the classifier’s robustness. The reason is that although
the distillation method significantly reduces the gradient of the loss
function with respect to small input changes, it is not effective when
a set of the features are modified at once, which is the case in the
black-box and blind models.
Classification with Rejection. A line of work studied the prob-
lem of classification with rejection, where the system can choose
not to classify an observation [50–54]. The reject option is used,
for instance, when the conditional class probabilities are close. In
a related work, in [55], the authors observed that correctly clas-
sified examples tend to have greater maximum probabilities than
erroneously classified and out-of-distribution examples. However,
it has been shown that adversarial examples can result in high con-
fidences in the wrong classes [9]. Therefore, rejecting the input by
examining the corresponding output probability distribution is not
effective in detecting the adversarial examples.
A similar approach is classifying invalid data as a “rubbish class”
[56–58]. In this approach, the classifier is trained to assign a uni-
form distribution to invalid data and then discards the samples with
low confidence during the test time. We have evaluated this method
and verified that, while it improves the robustness of the classifier
to adversarial examples, it does not provide similar trade-offs to
our proposed method for the test accuracy and detection rate of the
adversarial examples. In [59], the authors proposed augmenting
the classifier with a detector subnetwork which is a binary classi-
fier for distinguishing the clean data from adversarial examples; the
authors however did not provide the false alarm rate, i.e., the rate
of wrongly detecting clean data as adversarial. Moreover, it was
noted that an adversary can generate adversarial examples that fool
both the classifier and the detector.
In this paper, we proposed a training method that imitates the hu-
man reasoning by design; we augmented the output class set of the
classifier with an additional label and adaptively train the classifier
to assign adversarial examples to the new label with proper proba-
bility. Our method does not increase the complexity of deploying
ML systems in real-world settings. We evaluated our method in
black-box models and demonstrated that it effectively detects the
adversarial examples, without wrongly flagging the clean test data.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the problem of robustifying black-box
learning systems against adversarial examples. Adversarial exam-
ples are inputs, which are maliciously perturbed in order to deceive
the learning system into providing erroneous outputs. Adversarial
examples are known to transfer between classifiers; therefore, an
adversary can attack a black-box learning system, by generating the
adversarial example on a substitute classifier and then transfer them
to the target classifier. We performed extensive experiments on dif-
ferent ML classifiers and demonstrated their vulnerability against
adversarial examples even when a defense mechanism is employed.
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We then proposed the concept of NULL labeling, where we in-
tend to identify and discard adversarial examples, instead of clas-
sifying them into their original label. Our approach addresses a
fundamental problem of current ML classifiers that, while only a
tiny fraction of the input space is used for training, all possible in-
puts are allowed during the test phase. This causes the classifier to
show unexpected behaviors when it is queried with invalid inputs.
In contrast, we train the classifier to distinguish between the clean
and adversarial data. Our experimental results show that the pro-
posed method effectively blocks the transferability of the adversar-
ial examples by mapping them to the NULL label, while classifying
the clean test data into the valid labels.
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APPENDIX
A. DNNS USED FOR TRAINING
We demonstrated the results on deep neural networks trained on
the MNIST and GTSRB datasets. For both datasets, the networks
have two convolutional layers with 32 and 64 filters and with a ker-
nel size of 3 × 3, followed by a max-pooling layer. For MNIST,
the convolutional layers are followed by two fully-connected layers
with 200 rectified linear units. For GTSRB, the convolutional lay-
ers are followed by two fully-connected layers with 512 and 128
rectified linear units, with a dropout rate of 0.5. In both networks,
the classification is made by a softmax layer.
B. METHODS FOR GENERATING ADVER-
SARIAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we explain the methods used in the paper for
generating the adversarial examples.
Let `(X, y; θ) denote the loss of the classifier with parameters θ
on (X, y). The loss function quantifies the classifier’s goodness-of-
fit for the sample (X, y) under the parameters θ. When holding θ
fixed and viewing the loss as a function of (X, y), we simply write
`(X, y). We alternatively write `(X,Z) for the loss of the classifier
for input X and output probability vector of Z.
B.1 Adversarial Examples for Misclassification
Attack
In misclassification attack, the adversary intends to find a pertur-
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bation which causes the loss function to increase the most. There-
fore, we have:
δX∗ = argmax
‖δX‖≤·‖X‖
`(X + δX, y). (1)
In general, solving 1 is difficult due to its non-convex nature with
respect to δX and θ. Several works proposed solving the problem
by linearizing the loss function at the point X . Therefore, we can
write Equ. 1 as follows:
δX∗ = argmax
‖δX‖≤·‖X‖
`(X + δX, y)
≈ argmax
‖δX‖≤·‖X‖
`(X, y) +∇X`(X, y)T δX
= argmax
‖δX‖≤·‖X‖
∇X`(X, y)T δX (2)
where ∇X`(X, y) is the gradient of the function ` with respect
to the vector X . Based on this method, in [9], Goodfellow et al.
proposed Fast Gradient Sign (FGS) method for generating adver-
sarial examples with L∞ constraint. In this paper, we adopted this
method for the L0 norm constraint, i.e., we generate adversarial
examples with changing few input features, called adversarial fea-
tures, and proposed two methods, namely Grad0 and MG methods.
In the following, we provide the solutions for Grad0, MG and FGS
methods.
Grad0 Method. In this method, the adversary maximizes the term
∇X`(X, y)T (X∗ −X) such that ‖δX‖0=  · |X|. Therefore, to
compute X∗, we do the following procedure:
• Compute∇X`(X, y) and define a binary vectorX ′, for which
X ′i = 1 if and only if∇X`(X, y)i > 0.
• Let S be the set of indexes of  · |X| largest elements of
∇X`(X, y) ◦ (X ′ − X), where ◦ denotes the element-wise
product.
• Obtain X∗S = X ′S and X ∗¯S = XS¯ , where S¯ denotes the com-
plement set of S, and XS = {Xi|i ∈ S}.
• Return X∗ as the adversarial example, if the label of X∗ is
different from the label of X; if the label has not changed,
declare infeasibility.
MG Method. This method is similar to the Grad0 Method in that
the adversary maximizes∇X`(X, y)T (X∗−X). We however take
a greedy approach, i.e., we select and modify one feature at a time
until the input is successfully misclassified.
Grad∞ Method. The solution to this method is provided in [9] as
the following:
X∗ = X + sign∇X`(X, y).
We return X∗ as the adversarial example, if the label of X∗ is dif-
ferent from the label of X; if the label has not changed, we declare
infeasibility.
B.2 Adversarial Examples for Targeted Attack
In targeted attack, the adversary intends to find a perturbation
that minimizes the loss function for the input X and target label y∗
or target vector Z∗. Similar to Equations 1 and 2, we write:
δX∗ = argmin
‖δX‖≤·‖X‖
`(X + δX, y∗)
≈ argmin
‖δX‖≤·‖X‖
∇X`(X, y∗)T δX. (3)
In this paper, based on Equ. 3, we proposed two methods for
generating adversarial examples for trageted attack, namely Greedy
and STG Methods. In the following, we provide the solutions for
these methods.
Greedy Method. This method is similar to the MG method in that
the adversary takes a greedy approach for finding the adversarial
perturbation. However, in this method, at each iteration we select
and modify the feature that minimizes ∇X`(X, y∗)T (X∗ − X).
Note that the proposed greedy method is significantly faster than
the current greedy approaches, e.g. [10, 11], because for selecting
each feature, we only do one forward run and one blackpropaga-
tion; while current methods need to run the network at least |X|
number of times, for selecting each feature.
STG Method. In this method, we set the target output probability
vector ZT to be 1K for the K valid classes and use the L0 norm
constraint for generating adversarial examples. The adversary thus
minimizes ∇X`(X,ZT )T (X∗ − X) such that ‖δX‖0=  · |X|.
Similar to the Grad0 method, to compute X∗, we do the following
procedure:
• Compute ∇X`(X,ZT ) and define a binary vector X ′, for
which X ′i = 1 if and only if∇X`(X,ZT )i < 0.
• Let S be the set of indexes of  · |X| smallest elements of
∇X`(X,ZT ) ◦ (X ′−X), where ◦ denotes the element-wise
product.
• Obtain X∗S = X ′S and X ∗¯S = XS¯ , where S¯ denotes the com-
plement set of S, and XS = {Xi|i ∈ S}.
• Return X∗.
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